Traditionally hailed as a free, open, and community-sponsored endeavor, public education increasingly is permeated by corporate mechanisms and influences. In the United States and the United Kingdom, a growing awareness of the deficits in primary and secondary public schools, coupled with a mounting need to ready students for the global workplace, has spurred numerous reform efforts, among them for-profit school management corporations. For-profit school management corporations have lucrative potential, but only if they operate on a large scale. Thus, there is great incentive for these for-profit education service providers to broaden their markets, while there is little reason for them to invest in cultivating communities that can self-sufficiently educate their children.

Consequently, there is a strongly supported drive to expand global trade in service industries, even in education at the primary and secondary levels. Specifically, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) aims to eliminate the barriers to trade in services and to promote the policies of liberalization. While the expansion of markets benefits the for-profit education service industry, it is likely that public education will be the loser in this zero-sum game. This Note examines the viability of for-profit education services and the indicators that encourage its expansion in trade. Further, it offers some likely implications for systems of public education if trade in primary and secondary educational services flourishes.

Part I outlines the trends in economic globalization and discusses the effects of a policy of liberalism and the proliferation of privatization and deregulation— including service industries such as education. Part II discusses the current trends in the United States and the United Kingdom that facilitate and support the privatization and corporatization of primary and secondary education. This section also suggests ways in which globalization has encouraged the growth of this market. Part III addresses the impact that for-profit school management organizations have had on primary and secondary education in the United States and the United Kingdom. This section also considers the quality of education delivered, the effectiveness of the management system, and the degree of monetary success that for-profit school-management corporations have enjoyed. Part IV highlights mechanisms, such as GATS, which broaden global trade in services and encourage privatized management. Finally, Part V considers the implications of for-profit education service providers on systems of public education, particularly in those countries vulnerable to market influences.

The increase of international child abductions has been attributed to the increasing access of international travel and rising divorce rates. International abductions are more traumatic for both the child and the parent than domestic abductions. This is because “sheer distance, language barriers, and differences in cultural, legal, and economic systems intensify the trauma felt by the aggrieved parent as well as the child.” In addition, the child’s separation and complete isolation from his or her former life greatly increases the trauma he or she will endure. Regardless of the cause of the increase in child abductions across international borders, something needs to be done to stop this problem.

Spotlighting traditional medicine and the patent regime, this article first highlights elements of the debate surrounding the use of conventional IPRs for the protection of traditional knowledge. It underscores the acknowledged controversy and inadequacies of that approach, and draws attention to the ongoing effort to integrate indigenous knowledge-protection protocols into the IP project. In contrast to the hitherto one-sided focus on the conventional IP system, extant efforts look to draw in knowledge-protection schemes and protocols that exist within indigenous and non-Western customary practices and jurisprudence. These developments mark a more significant step toward a realistic approach to the protection of indigenous knowledge than is offered by the conventional IP system or sui generis options based on that system. This approach depicts a cross-cultural outlook on IPRs. The article then presents an overview of the trend at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

Finally, the article examines the perceived conflict between the centrifugal focus of the attempt to integrate customary regimes for knowledge protection into the IP discourse, and the phenomenon of globalization as symbolized by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement. The fact that the thrust of the effort to integrate indigenous knowledge-protection protocols into the IP discourse emphasizes the local poses a potential conflict to the current globalization initiative, especially in the IP arena. Even though TRIPs is an attempt to globalize IP, it does not change the status of IP as a subject under national jurisdiction. The effort to integrate knowledge-protection regimes from indigenous and local communities into the IP legal scheme could well have global ramifications. In effecting the legal protection of traditional knowledge, national governments would indeed be within their legitimate powers, both under the TRIPs Agreement and their commitments to various international instruments on the protection of indigenous peoples.

The need to integrate indigenous knowledge-protection protocols into IP discourse is a consequence of an indigenous renaissance and resistance that has yielded a logic of epistemological pluralism. Under this pluralism, indigenous holistic and subjective understanding of phenomena or ways of knowing compete for a space within knowledge-protection jurisprudence. This article argues that contrary to popular accounts, this competition is part of the globalization experience. The notion of integrating indigenous knowledge-protection protocols into the IP agenda does not necessarily conflict with the phenomenon of globalization, as many would think. Nonetheless, the integration project is at a nascent stage. It will surely raise a number of questions and concerns. Its relationship with globalization, with which this paper is concerned, is only one of the many issues that confront the cross-cultural momentum on IPRs.

In light of increasing interdependencies among states, it has become important to design a system of global democracy. Such a system could provide national populations with opportunities to communicate with one another that would allow them collectively to minimize negative interdependencies. Without a new design, national populations will continue to impose their will (or the effects of their decisions) on other nations, in turn reducing their potential for national autonomy.

In this article, I discuss the possibility of designing an international democratic system. Since my project is to design institutions, it differs from the work of such scholars as Anne-Marie Slaughter. Slaughter has written extensively on how nations influence and create interdependencies with one another at the global level, noting the interlocking effects on legal and political structures and relationships. She focuses on describing events occurring at the global level, whereas mine is a normative project, attempting to re-design the operations of the global level. She, for example, argues that “the state…is disaggregating into its separate parts, functionally distinct parts. These parts—courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order. Today’s international problems— terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation, money laundering, bank failure, and securities fraud—created and sustain these relations.” Slaughter thus documents trends and phenomena occurring at the global level. My approach, while in factual agreement with Slaughter about increasing interdependencies, has a prescriptive turn. My approach suggests new structures—new institutions—designed to deal effectively with the rise of nation-to- nation interdependencies.

One way to move to a more legitimate international legal system that addresses the rise of interdependencies is to facilitate national populations’ communication with one another. In other words, greater communication helps to move toward a democracy that includes the populations of all nations, linking them together. Indeed, there is a growing scholarly literature pointing to the need for a democratic conception of international relations and law, supplemented with the fact that a tide of democratic change has swept the world. As represented in the quotation above, the political philosopher Jürgen Habermas laments the absence of international democracy, after the great historical quest nations have undergone to achieve national democracy. Why not then consider democratic structures as a basis for international governance?

Several international relations theorists, political philosophers, and democracy scholars have attempted to reorient the literature on international relations, and contemplate the institutional implementation of international democracy. These include David Held, Thomas Franck, Michael Reisman, and Habermas. Michael Barkun in the 1960s and Joseph Weiler in 2000 cautioned scholars not to “adopt national or domestic analogies” as a starting point or explanatory model for the international level; scholars generally disregard this advice.

In light of these points, the goal of this article is to make design proposals to democratize the international level in the same way as Franck, who refers to international design as “rethinking structure.” The renowned social science philosopher Mario Bunge points out that the project of institutional design presupposes an understanding of the problems of current institutions, and that it is an “imaginative yet potentially feasible vision of society” that allows for advancements in social relations.

Although I say that I intend to explore institutional design, it is most definitely not my intent to evaluate all our contemporary “international” structures, indicate their problems, and recommend some possible proposals that could potentially stimulate alternative designs of the international system. In other words, while the ultimate goal is to design a complete, justified, and democratic set of international institutions, this article is meant solely to start the engine, rather than arrive at a final destination. And, as a starting point I argue that any design proposals for international democracy should preserve the autonomy of nations, yet allow the world’s national populations to communicate with one another.

The most typical, yet perhaps least realistic, institutional design suggestion is to establish a world government or single global assembly. Rather than develop a democracy for all nations in a single global assembly, it might be more appropriate to develop democracy by linking (either among or between) national populations without bringing them together under a single roof, where smaller nations might be overwhelmed by larger ones and prompted to cede their sovereignty. Linked national populations, by contrast, have the opportunity to “look into each other’s eyes.” This distinction might at first seem to be trivial, but after working and reflecting on this question for over a year, I consider this linkage of populations to be a key requirement for institutional design. Elucidating this notion is the goal of this article.

In Part I, I describe what I mean by interdependencies, and then describe what type of legitimacy and structural criteria are required to begin to think about international institution design.

In Part II, I first describe the two design criteria I use when thinking about democratic international institution design; the first is that the autonomy of nations should be preserved, and the second is that the division, referred to most notably by Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss as “bifurcation,” that separates the populations of nations from each other should be reduced or eliminated. In Part II.B, I describe some of the more prominent paradigms of international democracy, and evaluate their potential to address the design criteria set out in the preceding section. I conclude with Habermas’ public deliberation model of democracy and use it as a guide to inspire democratic institution design.

Finally, in Part III, I discuss several design proposals. I begin by exploring ways to conceive of international systems, and conclude that the development of a system that respects the political and cultural autonomy of nations, while still permitting active and productive connections linking nations’ populations, should be the general goal of international institution design. These ideas should be seen as a starting point, a work in progress, to begin to think about alternative international institutions.

Within the last decade, the possibility of an East Asian regional trade agreement (RTA) or a much broader Asia-Pacific integration has been debated extensively. Though not currently regionalized, Asia could be divided into three groups. In the Southeast Asian region, there is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN established the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993 and included Cambodia as its tenth member in 1999. In 1983, Australia and New Zealand organized the Australian/New Zealand Closer Economic Trade Relations Agreement (ANZCERTA) which has strengthened their cooperation with Asian countries, following the United Kingdom’s entry into the European Union (EU). South Asia, the second regional group, is made up of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, whose economic contribution in Asia is relatively small. The group remains divided by religious conflicts and a contentious history. A third regional group, Northeast Asia, has the potential to develop into a similar economic community because of the increasing necessity of integration among neighboring countries.

A recently proposed formation of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC)9 aimed to create an extended form of ASEAN, with China, Japan, and South Korea as its core states. A regional community requires a certain degree of cultural homogeneity, what is sometimes called “an inherent regional civil society.” Given the strong societal differences between Northeast and Southeast Asia, it would be more workable to establish the NEAC, while Southeast Asia strengthens AFTA, than to extend ASEAN to encompass Northeast Asia.

With the end of the Cold War, Asia-Pacific (including the Americas and Oceania) intergovernmental cooperation systems emerged from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, in 1989. APEC is a loose organization which has regional, multilateral, and interregional characteristics. “The subsequent Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) established an inter-regional dialogue system between East Asia with the European Union.”

A regional community like the EU15 established in Northeast Asia would provide several key benefits. Economically, the Northeast Asian countries would receive increased efficiency through economies of scale; increased productivity stimuli; strengthened bargaining power in the international market; and the “trade creation effect.” Even though economic theory does not support such integration in every instance, a regional community, on the whole, improves its productive abilities with the creation of gains from trade.

The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory (also called the factor-price equalization theorem), which is based on the theory of comparative advantage, postulates that welfare improvement within a community can be achieved through the exchange of goods created by each state’s plentiful factors of production and through price equalization. Free trade in a regional community brings optimum allocative efficiency by use of specialized factors of production. Given an extended opportunity, the use of these specialized factors would result in economies of scale and productivity stimulation. This theory, however, is premised on the idea that each country participant has different, plentiful factors of production and that these factors are homogenous.

A RTA brings with it two kinds of trade effects. One is the trade creation effect: this refers to the expansion of trade with efficient suppliers inside the community. The other is the “trade diversion effect,” which refers to a shift in trade from the efficient suppliers outside the community to inefficient suppliers located inside it. If the trade creation effect is larger than the trade diversion effect, then economic integration will bring a Pareto improvement. In the EU, regional integration has led to gains of about one percent of GDP. Moreover, the unmeasured dynamic gains that come from economies of scale and productivity stimuli make the net effect much larger. Even though some social losses can take place through integrated policies, such as the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), these are the harmonization costs for the integration. Through the establishment of a regional community, the Northeast Asian countries could reduce these negative integration effects.

Socio-politically, the Northeast Asian countries would strengthen their positions in international organizations and societies as a result of integrating into a regional economic community. The EU deals effectively with the United States by using a single discussion channel in matters like trade and disputes settlement, while Korea, Japan and China tackle the problems individually and often ineffectively. Increased exposure to the effects of international markets requires not only domestic policy adjustments but also a collective policy arrangement. Isolation also creates problems in electing or appointing officials to international organization; Asian countries are thus often unfairly treated. Thus, the countries need a push forward to create a regional community.

Transition from relative heterogeneity to increased social homogeneity in areas such as culture, economic policies, and security, in fact, is the process of regional integration. Northeast Asia, in which social homogeneity is ahistorical, lacks experiences of social interchange, and in this sense is fundamentally different from Europe. Even though the Chinese Character culture, Confucianism, and Mahayana Buddhism influenced all of Northeast Asia considerably, historically there have been only minimal diplomatic interchanges between governments and only small-scale, unofficial trade in the frontier areas. Moreover, the Northeast Asian countries’ levels of economic development differ greatly. Certain requirements must be attained before progressing to new levels of economic integration, and basic socio-cultural factors may limit this process, as is evident from European integration. Until now, the Northeast Asian peoples have not realistically considered regional integration, because of gaps in social homogeneity, poor experiences in social exchanges, and differences in economic development. However, there is increasing recognition of the need for a Northeast Asian organization that reflects competitive regionalism and globalization.

Regionalism can be approached in several ways. One approach, which is rooted in the neo-functionalists’ theory, describes regionalism as the incremental creation of regional institutions in response to various functional demands, such as enhancing the economic welfare of participating states. Another approach, rooted in federalist theory, is the model of fair distribution of power and competence at a level below a global organization. This approach, known as “constructivism,” focuses on the communal identity in regional integration. In constructivism, regional integration is “ideational products.” This approach emphasizes collective security, rather than a functional or economic need for the regional integration. This Note focuses on the neo-functionalist theory, since the main purpose of the NEAC would be the Pareto improvement of its members.

Presently, the causes of regional integration are primarily economic. When NATO lost its original “raison d’être,” regionalism faced a new situation: while security considerations became less salient, economic development became a central issue. Neo-functionalism has to meet new threats, such as environmental risks, drug-trafficking, and global terrorism. In addition to regionalism, globalization complicates these issues. Globalization is described as “flows of trade and finance between the major regions in the world economy, while equivalent flows within them can be differentiated in terms of local, national and regional clusters.” Both globalization and regionalism stimulate the interchange of goods and finance as well as the integration of subunits. Globalization and regionalism are thus both types of integration.

Regionalism continuously influences all aspects of life, from culture to politics to the economy. “Within the economic, or trade realm, the impact of regionalism has been especially pronounced.” Mass regionalism, rooted in neo-functionalism, was initiated after the collapse of the Cold War regime and with the beginning of WTO system. Europe has since been rearranged as a successful regional community. The United States has free trade agreements (FTAs) with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) as well as with Israel. At the Summit of the Americas, heads of state representing thirty-four American countries have reaffirmed their political commitment to strengthen hemispheric relations by approving the finalization of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005. In Latin America, not only may a broad Latin American free trade area result through a combination of the MERCOSUR and Andean Pacts, but that free trade area itself may be merged with NAFTA into the FTAA. In addition to ASEAN (AFTA) in Asia, some regional groups in central, eastern, and southern Africa have formed a continent- wide African Economic Community (AEC).

The growth of country membership in the WTO has not adversely affected the growth of regionalism. “Over 170 RTAs are currently in force.” In fact, global flourishing of RTAs makes Northeast Asian countries feel isolated. Globalization can also be defined as the growing integration of world markets, which brings denationalization of politics, markets, and laws. While China and North Korea have insisted on nearly absolute state sovereignty, there are increasing limitations on that sovereignty because of these globalizing trends. Globalization asks for a combination of self-rule and shared rule.

From the late 1960s to early 1970s, because of the disappointment from the post-colonial policies, Third World states applied regionalist practices toward trade and economic cooperation among the developing countries. During the Cold War, this regional hegemony created a sort of league of non-allied states. This regionalism, which was used by the Third World as a justification for the adoption of domestic policies such as socialism and the protection of infant national industries, did not advance globalization.

By contrast, the popular paradigm today is free trade, globalization, and substantial growth through competition. GATT’s article XXIV42 restricts the formation of regional fortresses, or exclusive economic blocs. It requires that any modern regionalism not be a malignant form but rather a bona fide form, one favorable to globalization. The regionalism of today cannot afford to be inward-looking because globalization has made markets more and more interconnected and interdependent. With GATT article XXIV, which makes regionalism compatible with multilateralism, globalization has broken down the traditional dichotomy between regionalism and multilateralism.

The regionalism of today responds to three aspects of globalization: the replacement of domestic markets by international markets; the decline of geographical determinants of money and labor; the continued intensification of multinational and private policy-making structures. Thus, a benign form of regional integration has a positive effect on global trade liberalization. Globalization and regional integration can be seen as complementary processes, modifying each other, in the formation of a new world order, even though they may be based on different situations or concrete issues. Another important force, accelerating change in production and consumption patterns, is the rapid progress of information and communications technology. The Internet, an important method of doing business today, has contributed to a borderless global economy by removing physical distance.

In this recognition of these trends, Northeast Asia has shifted its attention more and more toward the development of an institutional expression of its own identity. In the past, Japan regarded the EU and the United States as its main trade partners and was not very interested in its neighbor countries. In recent years, there are remarkable signs that the Japanese are rediscovering their regional identity, economically exemplified by Japan’s vigorous promotion of the Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (JKFTA). The JKFTA could induce China to participate in a regional community. China’s WTO participation with Taiwan in 2001 will promote free trade in this area once more. With China’s participation in the WTO, the WTO framework could serve as a common adivisor of Northeast Asia, accelerating trade regionalization. Moreover, both the APEC and the ASEM have moved in recent years to keep up the momentum of their early years.

Northeast Asia has a successful model of a regional community in the EU. In the case of the two Koreas, it should be noted that the unification of Germany was achieved with the integration of West Europe, and the formation of the EU. The unification of the two Koreas can be aided through a regional integration process as well. A considerable part of the unification cost, like EU’s various integration funds, would be the cost of North Korea’s accession to the NEAC. The China-Taiwan problem is somewhat different; Taiwan does not seek unification with China. The NEAC integration could be the answer to the problem. If the process involved substantial integration, asking a partial restriction on sovereignty, under supranational control, not only could it ease Taiwan’s apprehension of being absorbed by China, but also it could give China the same effect of two regimes under one state.

It is important that the NEAC not act as a “regional fortress.” Essentially, the NEAC should not take regional protectionist measures. Such action would be taken as a threat by non-members. As the trial of EAEC was considered by the United States to encourage economic rivalry with Japan, similar regional exclusiveness also could be considered a hegemonic stance. The NEAC not only should have good relations with the rest of the world, but also should pursue the common good of the world. A benign form of regional integration does not imply division of international society, because it strengthens the organizing international or global society through the integration of regional unit. Good empirical evidence suggests that the general political opposition of third countries to the EU, and its exercise of international legal rights, has now largely disappeared.

This Note is composed of three main parts. Part II will define the proposed NEAC. Focused on an economic integration and WTO rules, in order to define the NEAC, the present Northeast Asia situation and a reasonable degree of integration for countries in the region and the empirical implications of the EU should be considered. Part III discusses the economic necessity of the NEAC. This part explains the “custom factory effect,” derived from the NEAC integration. This part also shows the current degree of regionalization of Northeast Asia, by surveying the international transactions among the Northeast Asian states and analyzing the economic effects, such as the intensity index of trade, through formulae and statistics. Part IV explores the socio-political requirements for Northeast Asian countries to be able to integrate. This part seeks a way to meet these requirements, namely a potential method for the establishment of the NEAC. Then, this Note draws conclusions.

The Note then considers corporate social responsibility as a potential solution that could lead to the achievement of sustainable development. In doing this, the note examines the implications of adopting a corporate social responsibility regime for a multinational enterprise. The European Union’s (EU) initiative in creating corporate social responsibility guidelines is used as a detailed case study for scrutinizing the potential of corporate social responsibility as a viable solution. After analyzing the concept of corporate social responsibility and the need for sustainable development in light of globalization, the Note concludes that while corporate social responsibility may indeed lead to the desired goal— sustainable development—a regime such as that proposed by the European Union is likely to fail because of the lack of a strict enforcement mechanism whereby the actions of corporations operating globally can be monitored and socially irresponsible deeds can be penalized.

The predicate question—what is a “failed state?”—by no means lends itself to an easy answer. Like many questions involving statehood and international relations, the question of the failed state becomes more complicated the further one moves from the clear, core examples. It can little be controverted that Somalia and Afghanistan are in some important sense ‘failed.’ But, if characterization of a state as ‘failed’ may open the door to international intervention—even, potentially, intervention that leads to radical revision of the contours of the state—then the criteria for that characterization are very important indeed, for their existence in a state would lead to the displacement of the important presumption of modern international law that the state enjoys legal autonomy and is the vehicle whereby its citizens realize their right to self-determination. Yet autonomy and self-determination well may be the very principles impelling intervention; states in the developed world may argue that their own rights are derogated when violent and uncontrolled forces arise in a failed state and disrupt public order in their territories.